A mechanism to derive more truthful willingness to accept values for renewable energy systems by Radmehr M et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints | eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
Radmehr M, Willis K, Metcalf H. A mechanism to derive more truthful 
willingness to accept values for renewable energy systems. Heliyon 2018, 4(1), 
e00503.
DOI link 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00503  
ePrints link 
http://eprint.ncl.ac.uk/pub_details2.aspx?pub_id=245031  
Date deposited 
10/01/2018 
Copyright 
© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).  
Licence 
This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence 
 
 
A mechanism to derive more
truthful willingness to accept
values for renewable energy
systems
Mehrshad Radmehr a,*, Ken Willis b, Hugh Metcalf c
aCyprus International University Business School, Nicosia, Via Mersin 10, North Cyprus
[3_TD$DIFF]bCentre for Research in Environmental Appraisal & Management, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne,
NE1 7RU, UK
cNewcastle University Business School, 5 Barrack Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 4SE, UK
*Corresponding author.
E-mail address: mradmehr@ciu.ed.tr (M. Radmehr).
Abstract
This paper examines and compares households’ willingness to accept (WTA)/
willingness to pay (WTP) ratio for solar power equipment on their premises
through both a novel experimental approach and conventional techniques. The
experimental approach was administered by using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
method and cheap talk, with open-ended questions of WTA/WTP. The results were
quite striking. The ratio for the incentivised approach was 1.08:1; whereas for the
conventional approach it was 3.5:1. The findings suggest that the hypothesis that
WTP equals WTA cannot be rejected for the incentivised mechanism, and it
appears to control for the individual’s strategic behaviour bias as a treatment
against over-estimating WTA and under-estimating WTP. The findings also
provide some policy implications for Northern Cyprus: the government can set
lower financial incentives to increase the solar power installed capacity on the
island.
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1. Introduction
In 2005 the share of energy from renewable resources in gross final consumption in
Cyprus was 2.9%. The European Union (EU) Commission Directive 2009/28/EC
established a common framework for the use of energy from renewable resources
in order to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The EU set an obligatory target
for each member state. The EU target for the renewable energy sector’s share of
gross final energy use in Cyprus is 13% by 2020.
This target necessitates developing plans to implement renewable energy
technology projects and policies in the electricity sector. The North Cyprus
government has also set an incentive strategy to expand renewable energy
exploitation in an attempt to support environmental improvements; and to have
greater self-sufficiency in power generation, as a substitute to the imported sources,
whilst maximizing the efficiency of renewable energy sources (RES) utilization.
Cyprus has 300 days of sunny weather per year. There is thus a high potential for
solar energy utilization, particularly micro-generation solar panels. The govern-
ment is attempting to raise people awareness about the benefits of energy
efficiency, the need for diversification of sources of energy, and reduced
dependence on imported fossil fuels. The aim is to change people’s behaviour
towards renewable energy production and consumption, primarily by the use of
incentives. The adoption of renewable energy by households is both a private and
public good. The public good aspect of renewable energy adoption is the
household’s contribution towards reducing carbon emissions and reducing global
climate warming. The private good externality element is the reduction in visual
amenity of the property as a result of the installation of renewable energy solar
panel systems.
The aim of this research is to assess people’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for micro-
generation photovoltaic (PV) systems in Northern Cyprus, and their willingness-to-
accept (WTA) compensation to forego their right to micro-generation of PV on
their property.
2. Theory
CV has been used to measure the monetary value of both gains and losses in the
quantity of a good. WTA measures the minimum amount that an individual is
willing to accept as just compensation for the loss, whilst WTP measures the
maximum amount an individual is willing to pay rather than forego the
environmental gain (Hanemann, 1991).
Numerous studies have used CV to measure WTA compensation for the loss, and
WTP for the gain, of a ‘public good’, and also private goods, in environmental
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economics (McFadden, 1994; Carson, 1997; Bateman et al., 2002; Haab and
McConnell, 2002; Bateman and Willis, 1999).
The loss of an environmental good is typically valued more highly than an
equivalent gain in the good. This asymmetry between willingness-to-accept (WTA)
compensation for the loss of a good and WTP for a gain has long been a feature of
most CV results. Bishop et al. (1983) explained the discrepancy as an anomaly
arising from people’s unawareness of the value of environmental assets and non-
market values in monetary terms. Explanations for WTP–WTA asymmetry, in
terms of economic theory, have emphasised the role of substitution and income
effects (Hanemann, 1991, 1999). Disposable income constrains demand for
environmental improvements in terms of WTP, but not WTA compensation; whilst
the unique character (low substitutability) of some public and private goods implies
high compensation to offset utility loss. However, Plott and Zeiler (2005) using a
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak auction mechanism, and respondent or subject training,
found no difference between WTP and WTA across a variety of goods, thus calling
into question loss aversion theory in real market conditions.
Horowitz and McConnell (2002) analysed 45 studies which reported WTA and
WTP values, and found the mean WTA/WTP ratio was approximately 7.0; with a
higher WTA/WTP ratio (10.4:1) for public and non-market goods, and a ratio of
2.9:1 for ordinary private goods, with the lowest ratio being for experiments
involving forms of money. Haab and McConnell (2002) suggested that the
proportion of the difference between WTA and WTP for private goods, such as
pens and mugs, is not the same as for public goods, and this notion challenges
Hanemann’s assumption based on neoclassical theory. Nevertheless, studies have
shown that even for private goods, there is a divergence between WTP and WTA
(Horowitz and McConnell, 2002). According to neoclassical theory, the income
constraint is a factor limiting the value of WTP. Unlike WTP, WTA is not
constrained by income because consumers are able to demand greater monetary
amounts.
In survey instruments different methodical biases have been observed by CV
practitioners. Sudgen (1999) suggested the use of a well-designed instrument to
facilitate the minimisation of these biases to elicit true preferences in accordance
with an incentive-compatible mechanism. In attempting to weaken the endowment
effect, Plott and Zeiler (2005) proposed the need to control subjects’ misconcep-
tions. This effect can be controlled by using an incentive compatible elicitation
mechanism to clarify the minimum WTA and maximum WTP terminologies.
Bjornstad et al. (1997) proposed a teaching mechanism to simplify the CV
technique, on the basis that the parametric and non-parametric results which
suggested that the impact of “learning design” on eliminating of hypothetical bias
is highly effective. In addition to teaching and clarification tools, assuring
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respondents’ confidentiality is an effective tool to control the subject’s
misconceptions. Furthermore, research has identified the role of an incentive
compatible survey design in eliciting truthful answers in which respondents must
view their responses as an effective element over actions or decisions (Carson and
Groves, 2007). Potential hypothetical bias can be controlled by clarifying for the
respondents what is meant by a minimum WTA and maximum WTP. Indeed, the
importance of a market-like environmental setting for a decreasing ratio was
recommended nearly thirty years ago by Brookshire and Coursey (1987).
Various mechanisms exist to elicit truthful answers directly, such as take-it-or-
leave it offers, Vickrey auctions, nth-price auctions, BDM auctions, and incentive
compatible stated preference methods such as contingent valuation and choice
experiments. Neill et al. (1994) designed open-ended CVM questions and used two
types of hypothetical and second-bid or Vickrey auction surveys to value the same
good. In the Vickrey auction, individuals were asked to make the real payment
from their own pockets, for the good in question, in order to generate true results.
The values from both the hypothetical and Vickrey auctions were compared and
the findings indicated that an open-ended hypothetical valuation is not always
capable of providing unbiased true values. However, the Vickrey auction’s WTP
values were lower than the hypothetical ones, and the values were closer to the real
economic values. This suggests that situating individuals in a real market setting
supports the use of incentive compatibility in a survey to elicit truthful answers.
Similarly, Berry et al. (2012) compared the BDM and take-it-or-leave it values of
WTP for clean drinking water technology in northern Ghana. The take-it-or-leave-
it survey results showed a higher WTP compared with the BDM. The gap was
explained as a possibility the result of strategic behaviour and anchoring effects.
The study reported here uses a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) incentive
compatible experimental method along with cheap talk to mitigate some of the
behavioral and hypothetical anomalies that can potentially affect the use of CV in
estimating the benefit of environmental policies. In what follows we present and
compare the results of a conventional approach with a BDM experimental
approach. The experimental approach shows a lower WTA/WTP ratio than has
previously been reported in the environmental economics literature. In addition, the
average WTA value was significantly influenced by incentivised BDM setting
which sharply reduced the WTA values. Whereas, the average value of WTP was
not substantially greater than in the conventional study.
3. Background
The high capital cost of micro-generation solar technology is a barrier to
accelerating the distribution and supply of the technology. However, consumers
can be influenced by financial incentives to install solar panels on their premises.
Article No~e00503
4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00503
2405-8440/© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Previous studies have pointed to the viability of grid connected micro-generation
solar systems in the residential sector. Scarpa and Willis (2010) suggested that, in
the UK, government grants would need to be increased to attract more households
to install micro-generation systems and offset the higher cost of the renewable
energy (RE) micro-generation systems. However, their results showed that despite
households’ enthusiasm for investing and their willingness to pay for micro-
generation systems, the benefit households received from micro-generation was not
sufficiently large to cover the capital cost of micro-generation energy technologies.
Claudy et al. (2011) reviewed the Irish WTP for micro-generation technologies,
and found that their WTP was considerably lower than the actual market prices.
The main obstacle was said to be the initial cost of purchasing or installation, but
they also suggested more market based finance options for consumers such as
leasing and ‘fee for service.’ An alternative to leasing and fee for service might be
a network connection. Grid connection has a number of advantages over a stand-
alone or off-grid system, and may increase the number of investors. It offers both
reliability and financial benefits for consumers and an unfailing connection to
electricity would be guaranteed. Any excess generated electricity can be exported
and sold to the grid and electricity outages can be prevented by importing when
there is no sun. In addition, it saves the extra cost of installing batteries. However,
although the need for financial incentives to induce consumers has been recognised
by governments and policy makers, the economic cost and burden of lending
support should not be neglected. A cost-benefit analysis based on individuals’
responses provides an insight into the extent of the incentives required.
4. Methods
A CV method was used to evaluate WTP and WTA values. The underlying
demand function is the individual’s WTP. In addition, policy implications may be
drawn from CV responses which can be used to regulate the extent of the subsidies
and other types of financial incentive (Berry et al., 2012). The conventional CV
approach can be administered to respondents in different ways, such as open-ended
questions, a payment ladder, or as closed-ended single and double-bounded
dichotomous choice questions. An open-ended question asks the respondent
directly about the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for good X.
Despite the assumption that the close-ended referenda format is more incentive
compatible than open-ended in the hypothetical study (Arrow et al., 1993; Carson
and Groves, 2007), lower WTP values have generally been found to be elicited
with open-ended questions (Kriström, 1993; Brown et al., 1996). Balistreri et al.
(2001) found both open-ended and dichotomous choice questions over estimated
auction values and also the expected value for private goods, although the upward
bias in open-ended CV was less than that in dichotomous choice CV questions. List
and Gallet (2001) suggest that different elicitation mechanisms, including different
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auction mechanisms, cause disparity in value (relative to a base case Vickrey 2nd
price auction).
Lower WTP can be perceived as being due to the larger non-response proportions
in an open-ended format, relative to a dichotomous choice format. Protest bias
may affect WTP estimates, but this can differ between markets and referenda, and
by type of good, making unambiguous rules to deal with protest bids responses
difficult to establish (Jorgensen et al., 1999). In addition, sometimes respondents
with a lower propensity to meet the expense of the good in question may
overstate their WTP in an open-ended question. Carson and Groves (2007)
indicated the impossibility of formulating a simple open-ended matching question
that tactically corresponds to an incentive compatible binary discrete choice
question in an assessment setting, unless the respondents are provided either with
a specific price or a device that chooses the cost independent of the individual’s
answer. The use of BDM with the open-ended format is said to facilitate the
incentive compatibility of the survey setting (Becker et al., 1964; Sudgen, 1999;
Carson and Groves, 2007). With this technique, individuals have the incentive to
state their maximum WTP truthfully, and the approach would be free of
behavioural bias (Horowitz, 2006).
In addition, to control the hypothetical problem of an SP survey, a number of
studies have suggested the use of cheap talk to minimise the hypothetical bias
effect either in open-ended or close-ended formats (List, 2001; Brown et al., 2003;
Carlsson et al., 2011; Carson and Groves, 2011). With an open-ended question, the
cheap talk script resulted in decreasing in the quantity of respondents stating a zero
WTP; thus hypothetical bias was circumvented, although the average of WTP
appeared to increase (Carlsson et al., 2011). Cheap talk, explaining solar panels,
energy generated, and benefits, was employed in both the conventional CV
treatment, and in the experimental treatment. So any difference between the
conventional and experimental treatments should be attributable to the difference
between the conventional and experimental treatments only.
Carson and Groves (2011) stated that cheap talk is not a costless technique for non-
market valuation if it influences the actions of players in the game. Therefore, the
economic value of the difference with and without its use needs to be estimated.
The term cheap talk is used in the game theory in an attempt to prevent the
dominant strategy in such a way that an individual has no incentive to lie in the
game, the so called the equilibrium strategy. This strategy occurs when players
share information consistently and in balance with incentives.
To implement a survey with the objective of gathering truthful responses, it is
essential for the survey to be designed in accordance with an incentive
compatibility format, owing to the high possibility of an individual over-stating
or under-stating the value of the good in question: so called strategic behaviour.
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This may happen when respondents think that a decision will be made based on
their evaluation, but that they will not be called upon to pay their stated price.
To avert or minimise some of the limitations of the CV method, an
incentivised mechanism can be incorporated prior to asking key questions. For
instance, an incentive compatible survey can be implemented through the
following instruments: a voting system, price auction, lottery auction, games,
prize draw, and the selling and buying of items. The information revealed by
the respondents’ answers would be the outcome of incentive strategies and the
explicit information about the question itself to the respondent. Following
studies by Eisenberger and Weber (1995) and Plott and Zeiler (2005), and
Chilton et al. (2012), this study also evaluates WTP and WTA via a
conventional and an experimental survey of separate samples of respondents.
Conventionally, individuals are asked their maximum WTP and minimum
WTA. To help respondents gain a better understanding of minimum WTA and
maximum WTP concepts, and the potential consequences of over- and under-
stating values, an experimental survey with the incentive compatibility was
designed and implemented.
In addition, to control for order effects and allow for a between and within
subject evaluation, the study was carried out with two groups of respondents
with and without the experimental approach. The respondents of one group
were individually asked to respond to the open-ended questions without the
use of clarification and experimental values. They were required to state their
minimum WTA and maximum WTP for solar technology equipment.
The other survey was elicited with the same open-ended question, but prior to that
we used the experimental approach. Prior to eliciting values for the solar
technology intervention, we administered a practice BDM using a familiar good
and with cheap talk, before asking the main question about PV solar panels. In so
doing, we were relying on rationality spillover: whether rationality that is induced
by a market-like discipline spills over into a non-market setting involving
hypothetical choices (see Cherry et al., 2003).
The results of these two settings were compared to determine the role of the
incentivised mechanism. The experimental approach aimed to elicit the truthful
minimum WTA and maximum WTP responses, which requires beginning with the
respondents’ familiarity with the terminologies prior to asking the main WTA and
WTP questions. The protocol included firstly, familiarising respondents with the
concepts of minimum WTA and maximum WTP and the consequences of
untruthful responses; and secondly, asking respondents to state their minimum
WTA and maximum WTP for installation of 1kWp micro-generation solar panels
on their premises. Finally, respondents provided some socio-economic and
demographic information about themselves.
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5. Experimental
The content of the protocol was supplemented by visual aids, to aid memory and
assist the respondents with the questions. The protocol consisted of two sections on
WTA and WTP, and the minimum WTA concept was first introduced and
practised. Between five to twelve respondents participated in each group session
and the participants were incentivised by the opportunity to enter a prize draw for a
prize of €10. The practice procedure started with an introductory session on the
study’s subject and brief information was given to them about micro-generation
solar technology for the residential sector.
The group discussion began by introducing the term ‘reserve price’ as a substitute
for the term maximum WTA. Based on other studies, respondents are usually more
comfortable with ‘reserve price’ as a term, and these participants were familiarised
with the term by discussing the process of selling (600 m2) land in an auction. The
reserve price was explained as the lowest fixed price (floor price), at which the land
would be offered at the auction sale. This was followed by introducing the term
‘external sealed bid’, and also to simplify the meaning of minimum WTA.
Respondents were divided into two groups and asked to discuss a ‘reserve price,’
i.e. the minimum price they would accept for a Teddy (which had been given to
them beforehand). Then, the reserve price was compared with a predetermined
sealed bid in a second price auction mechanism. After comparison between the
respondents’ answers and the sealed bids, the question of ‘why it is always best to
be truthful’ was discussed. In particular, the experimenter should clarify the
possibility of the undesirable consequences of over- or under-stating, i.e. in the
case of over-bidding, there is a danger that the vendor keeps the item rather than
selling it. Similarly, this is the case of under-bidding when the item sells for less
than it is worth. Respondents were given a ‘memory jogger’ to summarise the key
concepts, and their answers were recorded in response books.
The subsequent valuation survey was based on individual answers, so it was
important that respondents had some experience of deciding their own WTA for an
item. Participants were given two tokens for entry to a prize draw. In each of two
rounds, participants recorded their ‘reserve price’ or minimum willingness to
accept, for selling the token and foregoing entry into the draw. Their reserve price
was compared with a sealed bid in an envelope (100 bids ranging from [4_TD$DIFF]€1 to €10),
which had already been randomly selected from a visible box at the front of the
room. If their reserve price was lower than, or equal to, this sealed bid they would
sell the token, and receive a higher or equivalent sealed bid, but if the reserve price
was higher, s/he would not sell the token and be put into the draw.
In the WTP process, contributors were given €2 to spend, €1 in each round, to buy
two tickets for entry to a prize draw for €10. In each round, participants’ maximum
willingness to pay was recorded in order to buy a token to enter into a new prize
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draw. Then, after participants were shown a box of chocolates and told that it
would be sold, they were asked how much they were willing to pay for it. In other
words, the respondents were asked to bid their maximum willingness to pay for the
box of chocolates. Before respondents had revealed their maximum WTP amount
for the box of chocolates, they were sufficiently familiarised with the potential
consequences of over- or under-bidding. In the case of under-bidding when the
offered price for the item is less than it is worth, there is a danger of the item not
being sold to the buyer, if the vendor decides not to sell for the offered value.
Based on the predetermined value or sealed bid price, the respondent’s maximum
WTP was evaluated. Respondents had the memory jogger in their hands
throughout the practice in the form of their response books.
6. Materials and methods
The survey and questionnaire were vetted and approved by Newcastle University
Ethics Committee. Informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to
their participation in the study.
At the start of the solar technology evaluation questions, respondents were
sufficiently practised and experienced for truthful bidding. In addition, respondents
were supported by the memory jogger hand-out throughout the micro-generation
solar system evaluation. Then, the respondents’ evaluation of the micro-generation
solar technology was carried out using the cheap talk script below:
The process of the discussion that we went through was implemented with the
intention of eliciting your truthful responses. We tried to clarify what will be
the consequences of overestimating a value to incentivise you to state an
amount close to your actual valuation.
Then, the participants were requested to imagine that the government or private
company was offering to install micro-generation solar panels on their properties.
An area of 8 m2 was considered for the installation of 1 kWp solar panels,
including a space allowance for maintenance; with attendant visual amenity
impact. Respondents were asked to consider, their minimum willingness to accept
compensation, for not being permitted to install 1 kWp solar panels.
After the respondents had answered the first question, they were then asked to
imagine that a government or private company had offered to install 1 kWp micro-
generation solar panels in an area of 8 m2 in their property. Respondents were
asked to reveal their maximum willingness to pay.
Throughout the evaluation, the respondents were supported with memory joggers
and were given sufficient explanations and opportunities to ask questions from the
moderator. Finally, participants provided some demographic information, and the
session finished with the prize draw.
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The target population of this study was drawn from a residential sector in Northern
Cyprus. The survey was conducted in urban areas including Nicosia, Famagusta
and Kyrenia as well as rural regions, including Karpaz and Iskele, Guzelyurt and
Lefke. In total, 105 respondents comprised the sample of this study, and they were
the decision makers for the household expenditure, regardless of their gender. All
the participants were aged above 18 with a mean age of 45. Each experimental
session was comprised of five to twelve participants and it ended in one to two
hours depending on the size of the group. The sessions were held at different places
such as houses, cafes, companies and university.
The sample population for the conventional CV study was 50 respondents, who
were interviewed individually. These respondents were not provided with any
clarification on terminologies of maximum WTP and minimum WTA prior to
being asked the CV WTA and WTP questions. On the other hand, the opportunity
to clarify terminologies was provided in the experimental survey, and this study
was conducted with 55 respondents in groups of five to twelve.
7. Results
In order to compare the WTA/WTP divergences, the WTA/WTP ratios of the
conventional and experimental approaches were calculated separately. Table 1
shows the outcome of the conventional approach, where the mean WTA was
€15,418 and the mean WTP was €4392. The WTA/WTP ratio was approximately
3.5:1.
In addition, to explore the disparity when the highest bids are removed, a
sensitivity analysis was carried out (Bateman et al., 2002). Table 2 shows the
results of the truncation analysis for conventional approaches. The top 5% of
values were trimmed, which resulted in top values of 50 K and 30 K. Therefore, the
mean ratio decreased from 3.50:1 to 1.343:1. However, a degree of arbitrariness is
incorporated into the approach.
The result of the experimental mechanism is provided in Table 3. This result
explicitly illustrates the function of the experimental mechanism, in that the WTA
and WTP values have converged. A significant reduction in WTA values resulted
Table 1. Conventional approach.
N Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
50 WTA 15,418.85 26,821.11 2800 170,000
50 WTP 4392.95 9053.47 700 60,000
Ratio 3.50990 2.9625
Values in Euros, 2013 prices.
Article No~e00503
10 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00503
2405-8440/© 2017 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
in a mean value of €6390. Therefore, the WTA/WTP converged at 1.08:1.
Subsequently, the standard deviation values for WTA and WTP from the
experimental mechanism were more consistent and had a lower obtained ratio.
As reported in Table 4, participants’WTP increased from 4392 to 5913 Euros, with
a WTPE/WTPC ratio equal to 1.34, when they were provided with an intuitive
understanding of the terminologies. Similarly, respondents’ WTA decreased from
15,418.85 to 6390 Euros with 0.41 WTAE/WTAC ratio.
Additionally, a T test shows that the difference between WTAE–WTAC is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level, whereas the difference between
WTPE–WTPC is not statistically significant.
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the WTAE value was considerably influenced by
the impact of the experimental setting compared with the WTPE value. The
significant reduction in WTAE values via experimental setting implies that there is
a greater need for clarification on WTA term compared with WTP. In other words,
it is more important to tackle the elicitation of truthful responses from WTA
questions than from WTP questions.
Finally, a T test on the difference between WTAE–WTPE is insignificant, whereas
it is significant between WTAC–WTPC
As a result, the experimental approach showed a lower ratio (WTA/WTP) than has
previously been reported in the environmental economics literature. The average
WTA value was significantly influenced by the incentivised setting and its value
Table 2. Truncation analysis for conventional approach.
N Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
46 WTA 10,737.36 18,756.02 2800 50,000
46 WTP 7992.1 20,655.72 700 30,000
Ratio 1.343 0.9080
Values in Euros, 2013 prices.
Table 3. Experimental mechanism.
N Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
55 WTA 6390.11 5196.85 1700 35,000
55 WTP 5913.77 3222.76 2600 18,000
Ratio 1.080715 1.612
Values in Euros, 2013 prices.
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sharply decreased, whereas the average value of WTP was not substantially greater
than in conventional studies.
8. Discussion
This study tested the role of incentives on individuals’ estimation of WTA and
WTP for micro-generation solar panels. The discrepancies between WTA and
WTP valuations are recognised as an obvious problem in the CV surveys.
However, true preferences can be elicited through an incentivised mechanism. The
incentive-compatible mechanism provides respondents with an adequate under-
standing and does not encourage strategic biases (Sudgen, 1999). The reduced
discrepancy between the conventional and experimental mechanisms agrees with
the economic theory and literature findings.
The suggested novel experimental approach allowed the convergence of WTA and
WTP, when the respondents were sufficiently incentivised to respond. The average
discrepancy based on the 45 studies on WTA/WTP ratio was found by Horowitz
and McConnell (2002) to be (10.4:1) for public and non-market goods, with a ratio
of 2.9:1 for ordinary private goods. The conventional setting results here, with an
average WTA/WTP 3.5:1 ratio is consistent with the average ratio in the literature.
This ratio substantially decreased to 1.08:1 in the experimental or incentivised
setting. Consequently, this finding agrees with the hypothesis that the incentivised
setting will perform better than the conventional setting in terms of avoiding
strategic and hypothetical biases. The perceived larger sum to compensate in the
conventional setting corroborates previous studies (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984).
The findings agree with studies by Scarpa and Willis (2010) and Claudy et al.
(2011) on WTP for micro-generation, in that households are willing to pay for
micro-generation systems, but the benefit households receive from micro-
generation are not sufficiently large to cover the capital cost of micro-generation
energy technologies. Financial incentives are thus required to encourage people to
invest in micro-generation technologies, if renewable energy targets are to be met.
However, the findings of the suggested novel experimental setting here indicate a
higher support from respondents for covering the capital costs of micro-generation
Table 4. Means of WTPs and WTAs.
Variable Mean WTP Mean WTA
Experimental-maximum WTP 5913.77 (3222.76) 6390.11 (5196.85)
Conventional-maximum WTP 4392.95 (9053.47) 15,418.85 (26,821.11)
Ratio 1.34 (0.36) 0.41 (0.19)
Values in Euros, 2013 prices, Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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solar technology. This was achieved when individuals had a better understanding
of the WTA and WTP questions, the consequences of overestimating and
underestimating, and the good in question (micro-generation solar technology).
Subsequently, they revealed truthful responses.
9. Conclusions
This paper assesses the households’ acceptance and preferences for the installation
of micro-generation solar panels in the residential sector. The individuals’ WTA
compensation for the loss of a 1 kWp solar panel (i.e. loss of electricity generated
for own personal consumption and export to the grid), and WTP for installation of
1 kWp solar panel, was tested. The survey was implemented via conventional and
incentivised settings. The discrepancy between WTA and WTP within each setting
and between the settings was compared. The most obvious findings are: (1) that
WTA is statistically different to WTP in the conventional setting, whereas it is
equivalent in the experimental setting; (2) a smaller value of WTA for
compensation and larger WTP are observed in the incentivised setting compared
with the conventional setting.
Conventional CV methods may not derive truthful WTA and WTP responses. The
experimental setting results suggest that policy makers could reduce financial
incentives to increase the solar power installations in Cyprus.
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